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Respondents’ challenge to the Guidance does not
present an Article III case or controversy. The alleged injuries on which respondents base their claim
of standing all involve indirect and incidental effects
of a kind that this Court has never found sufficient to
justify an exercise of the judicial power. Accepting
any of respondents’ proffered bases for standing
would fatally compromise “the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases
or controversies,” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,
547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006), and do violence to the
“separation-of-powers principles” that serve “to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the
powers of the political branches,” Clapper v. Amnesty
Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013).
If the Court reaches the merits, it should uphold
the Guidance because it is a substantively and procedurally sound exercise of the Secretary’s broad statu(1)
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tory authority under the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. Respondents have
emphasized the Guidance’s scope—but now concede
(Br. 39) that the Secretary has unreviewable discretion to accord each alien it covers a non-binding, temporary reprieve from removal. That perfectly describes deferred action. The crux of respondents’
challenge to this exercise of discretion—the claim that
it confers on aliens whose presence Congress has
deemed unlawful the right to remain lawfully in the
United States—is simply wrong. Aliens afforded
deferred action remain in violation of the immigration
laws, are subject to removal proceedings at any time,
and gain no defense to removal. See pp. 16-18, infra.
And respondents are wrong to insist that, even though
Congress has authorized the Secretary to tolerate the
ongoing presence of the parents and children at issue
here, the Secretary is forbidden to authorize them to
work to provide for their families while they remain
here. The INA contains no such senseless restriction
on the Secretary’s authority.
I. RESPONDENTS LACK ARTICLE III STANDING
A. None Of Respondents’ Theories Satisfies Article III

Respondents lack Article III standing because they
have not alleged a concrete, particularized injury to a
legally protected interest that is fairly traceable to the
Guidance.
1. Self-generated costs

Respondents cannot establish Article III standing
on the basis of the incidental effect of the Guidance on
which the court of appeals relied: Texas’s claim that
the Guidance will lead it to incur increased expenses
in subsidizing the issuance of driver’s licenses.
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a. Any increased subsidy costs Texas may incur
provide no basis for standing because they are not
fairly traceable to the Guidance. Texas has chosen to
subsidize driver’s licenses for all aliens within various
federal immigration categories. If that choice no
longer suits Texas’s interests, it can make a different
choice. What it cannot do is maintain the voluntary
link between its fisc and federal law, and then demand
that federal policy not change in a way that would
indirectly increase its costs.
This is not an argument (Resps. Br. 22) that a litigant lacks standing whenever it can change its own
behavior to avoid injury that a defendant’s actions
would otherwise inflict. The point is far narrower, but
nonetheless fundamental under our system of separate sovereigns: When a State makes a voluntary
choice to tie a state-law subsidy to another sovereign’s
actions, the State does not thereby obtain standing to
sue the other sovereign whenever the latter’s actions
incidentally increase the cost of that subsidy.
That is the holding of Pennsylvania v. New Jersey,
426 U.S. 660 (1976), and respondents cannot distinguish it. There, as here, the State’s injury was “inflicted by its own hand,” and “nothing prevent[ed]”
the State from changing its law to eliminate the harm.
Id. at 664. It is irrelevant that Pennsylvania was an
original-jurisdiction case. Article III’s original jurisdiction extends only to “cases” or “controversies,” and
Pennsylvania involved neither because the alleged
harm was self-generated. Ibid. This Court accordingly has applied Pennsylvania outside the originaljurisdiction context. E.g., Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1151.
And like Texas, Pennsylvania adopted its subsidy
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before the change that prompted its suit. See Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. at 662-663.
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992), is not
to the contrary. Respondents suggest (Br. 25) that
Wyoming overruled Pennsylvania, but it does not
even mention Pennsylvania—doubtless because Wyoming did not involve self-generated injury—and this
Court’s reliance on Pennsylvania in Clapper demonstrates it was not overruled. In Wyoming, Oklahoma
enacted a tax that discriminated “on its face and in
practical effect” against Wyoming coal, in violation of
the Commerce Clause. 502 U.S. at 441. Oklahoma
utilities purchased “virtually 100%” of their coal
from Wyoming, and the law’s stated purpose was to
reduce the use of “Wyoming coal.” Id. at 443. Wyoming thus did not involve the situation—here and in
Pennsylvania—where the plaintiff State voluntarily
yoked its fisc to another sovereign’s policies, and then
sued to challenge those policies on the basis of their
incidental costs. Like Pennsylvania, Texas lacks a
legally protected, judicially cognizable interest in
challenging the other sovereign’s actions on such a
basis.
b. To the extent that respondents assert injury to a
quasi-sovereign interest in Texas not feeling “pressure” to change its policies, that alleged injury is
entirely speculative, and not concrete, particularized
or certainly impending. Texas’s current policy is
embodied in its existing laws and Department of Public Safety (DPS) policies. Texas chose to subsidize
licenses for all eligible individuals, including deferredaction recipients and many others, because it believed
the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. Texas is
free to alter those judgments in any number of ways.
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See U.S. Br. 25-26. But Texas has not changed its
policies in response to the Guidance (or in response to
the 2012 DACA policy). And it is impossible to know
what change, if any, the Texas legislature or DPS
might make in the future, what the basis for any such
change might be, or whether federal law would
preempt that choice. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495
U.S. 149, 158 (1990) (“Allegations of possible future
injury” are insufficient.); Dellinger Amicus Br. 19-24.
If Texas’s legislature or DPS were to act, a concrete case or controversy could be prompted. A person denied a subsidized license (or charged a higher
price) could challenge that action, and Texas could
defend on the ground that its new policy is not
preempted. 1 But it makes a mockery of this Court’s
steadfast adherence to Article III’s limitations to
argue that federal courts should adjudicate respondents’ challenge to the Guidance in a suit against the
United States in the absence of any change in Texas
law or policy—based on speculation that Texas might
someday make a change and that, if it did so, that
change might be preempted.
c. Finally, respondents lack standing to press the
arguments in their brief—even if the “subsidy” theory
were valid. Respondents make clear (Br. 20-21) that
1

That is the posture of Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer,
No. 15-15307, 2016 WL 1358378 (9th Cir. Apr. 5, 2016). The court
there held that federal law preempts Arizona’s choice to issue
driver’s licenses to aliens with employment authorization documents (EADs) issued because they applied for adjustment of
status or for cancellation of removal, but not to aliens with EADs
because of deferred action or deferred enforced departure, when
“the federal government treats th[e] EADs the same in all relevant
respects.” Id. at *11. Arizona did not invoke cost to justify its
choice. Ibid.
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they do not object to deferred action (i.e., notifying
the alien of a non-binding and temporary reprieve, as
a matter of discretion), but instead challenge only “the
Executive’s affirmative granting of lawful presence
and work authorization.” But Texas issues licenses to
aliens on the basis of deferred action itself. Tex. DPS,
Verifying Lawful Presence 4 (July 2013). Whether an
alien is “lawfully present” for purposes of Social Security or for the three- or ten-year admissibility bars
under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B) is irrelevant to eligibility
for a driver’s license. And although Texas grants
licenses to aliens with work authorization, id. at 3,
aliens can obtain work authorization via the Guidance
only if they already have deferred action, 8 C.F.R.
274a.12(c)(14), and thus are eligible for a driver’s
license under Texas law even without work authorization. Texas therefore cannot meet Article III’s redressability requirement: The same individuals would
be eligible for the same license at the same price—
with or without Social Security, tolling of unlawful
presence, or work authorization.
2. Social services costs

Respondents cannot establish a cognizable Article
III injury based on their more generalized allegations
that the Guidance will have the incidental effect of
increasing Texas’s costs not only for driver’s licenses,
but also for education, health care, and social services.
This Court has never found such claims to be cognizable under Article III, and doing so here would
utterly transform the judicial power. Federal courts
would displace the political process as the preferred
forum for policy disputes between individual States
and the federal government because a potentially
limitless class of federal actions could be said to
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have incidental effects on a State’s fisc. See U.S. Br.
30-33; pp. 9-11, infra. For example, the decision to
regulate—or even not regulate—a particular drug or
medical device might impose increased health care
costs on a State. Similarly, if “significant law enforcement costs” can generate standing, Resps. Br.
27, then virtually any federal non-prosecution policy
(such as for possessing small amounts of controlled
substances) could arguably lead to increased state
spending.
Under our federal system of separate sovereigns, a
State has no legally protected interest in avoiding
such indirect and incidental consequences of actions
taken by the United States in regulating individuals’
conduct pursuant to the powers vested in it by the
Constitution. U.S. Br. 22-23. This Court has accordingly never recognized such claims as “legally and
judicially cognizable.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811,
819 (1997). And it would be especially inconsistent
with the constitutional structure to allow such claims
to proceed when they involve immigration. A State
lacks authority to interfere with federal immigration
policies because, under the Constitution and the INA,
formation of immigration policies is committed to the
national government on the basis of the interests of
the Nation as a whole, even though those policies may
have significant indirect effects on the State.
Furthermore, as the district court found, respondents’ allegations of social-services costs are “too speculative to be relied upon by this or any other court.”
Pet. App. 313a. Those asserted costs flow from aliens’
mere presence in the State. Ibid. To find that the
Guidance will incidentally increase them, the Court
would have to conclude that the parents and children
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here would leave this country in sufficient numbers to
materially reduce those costs, if the Guidance were
invalidated. But as respondents recognize (Br. 39),
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has
separately (and validly) exercised its discretion to
make these individuals non-priorities for removal.
These individuals have lived in this country for years
and are particularly unlikely to depart voluntarily,
leaving their children behind. And work authorization
naturally ameliorates need for state services, and thus
should reduce the pressure on the State’s fisc. Respondents’ alleged social-services costs thus are exceedingly unlikely, not “certainly impending.” Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147.
3. Parens patriae

Respondents’ parens patriae argument (Br. 30-31)
is meritless: “A State does not have standing as
parens patriae to bring an action against the Federal
Government.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto
Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 610 n.16 (1982).
4. “Special solicitude”

Respondents cannot overcome these obstacles to
standing by invoking the “special solicitude” for
States referred to in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
497, 520 (2007). Respondents have not asserted a
judicially cognizable “quasi-sovereign interest” protected by a specific “procedural right”—the two considerations Massachusetts identified as necessary for
its ruling. Ibid. The sovereign interest in protecting
sovereign territory is well-settled. Id. at 519. But
third parties generally lack a legally protected interest in enforcement of the immigration laws against
others, or the provision of benefits to others. And
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although Congress can provide States protection
against certain indirect costs of immigration policies,
e.g., 8 U.S.C. 1231(i), Congress has not created protection for States against the incidental impacts asserted
here.
The generic cause of action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., is also
no substitute for the necessary conditions for standing
in Massachusetts. It would have made little sense for
this Court to attach “critical importance” to Congress’s creation of a particular procedural right, Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 516, if the APA already made
that right available generally. And respondents’ approach would allow States to bring claims to “vindicate the public’s nonconcrete interest in the proper
administration of the laws,” notwithstanding this
Court’s assurance that such suits would not be “entertain[ed].” Id. at 516-517.
B. Respondents’ Theories Would Fundamentally Transform Article III

The limitation of the judicial power to cases and
controversies “is crucial in maintaining the tripartite
allocation of power set forth in the Constitution.”
DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 341. But respondents’
theories would expand the judicial power far beyond
its circumscribed boundaries, and create precisely the
risk of usurpation of the power of the political
Branches that Article III forbids. See Clapper, 133
S. Ct. at 1146.
In response, the most respondents can say (Br. 34)
is that Article III’s injury-in-fact and causation requirements would make it “much more difficult” to
challenge grants of immigration relief in individual
cases. But respondents do not deny that their theory
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would give a State standing to challenge any policy
affecting any significant group of aliens—challenges
that are the most likely to interfere with sensitive
foreign policy imperatives and pressing humanitarian
concerns.
In respondents’ view, individual States could have
challenged the federal government’s decision to admit
or parole thousands of Cubans fleeing the Castro
regime in the 1960s or thousands of Vietnamese fleeing a Communist takeover in the 1970s, to provide
safe harbor to thousands of Chinese who feared returning to their country after Tiananmen Square in
the 1990s, or to issue any other consequential immigration policy. See U.S. Br. 31. This risk is not hypothetical, as Texas has sued the United States to block
the settlement of Syrian refugees in the State. See
Texas Health & Human Servs. Comm’n v. United
States, No. 15-cv-3851, 2016 WL 1355596 (N.D. Tex.
Feb. 8, 2016).
Respondents’ theory of standing would also permit
States to challenge changes to the federal definition of
“disabled veteran,” “adjusted gross income,” or “poverty,” or any other federal standard—so long as the
State has linked its fisc to that standard. U.S. Br. 32.
Indeed, if the Court were to find standing based on
incidental impacts on the state treasury even without
such a link, virtually any change in federal policy
could prompt an Article III dispute. The judicial
power would then extend to “almost every subject on
which the executive could act,” “[t]he division of power
[among the branches of government] could exist no
longer, and the other departments would be swallowed up by the judiciary.” DaimlerChrysler, 547
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U.S. at 341 (quoting 4 Papers of John Marshall 95
(Charles T. Cullen ed., 1984)).
Respondents suggest (Br. 34-35) that there is no
need to worry because a plaintiff also must be within
the zone of interests to sue, and suits must ultimately
have merit. That is cold comfort, given that respondents also argue (Br. 37-38) that States are always
within the INA’s zone of interests and that anyone
who wants to comment in an administrative proceeding can assert a cognizable notice-and-comment claim.
The merits of a case are also no answer to an overreach of jurisdiction, as Article III’s limitations “are
an essential ingredient of separation and equilibration
of powers.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,
523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998).
Rather than deal seriously with the Judiciary’s
properly limited role in our system of government,
respondents seek to stoke “the natural urge to proceed directly to the merits of this important dispute
and to ‘settle it’ for the sake of convenience and efficiency.” Raines, 521 U.S. at 820. That is precisely
what this Court’s precedents caution against, and
respondents’ claims should be dismissed.
II. RESPONDENTS LACK A CAUSE OF ACTION

A. Respondents’ alleged injuries are far outside the
“zone of interests” of any relevant statute. Respondents acknowledge that they “lack[] a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution
of another.” Br. 20 (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,
410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973)). They are therefore outside
the zone of interests of decisions regarding deferred
action itself, i.e., notifying an alien of a non-binding,
temporary decision to forbear. And respondents’
claims about deferred action’s consequences are even
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further afield: Title II Social Security is a federal
benefit paid from federal taxes on the alien’s earnings,
8 U.S.C. 1611(b)(2); tolling of “unlawful presence” is
solely relevant to determining whether an alien is
admissible under federal immigration law, 8 U.S.C.
1182(a)(9)(B); and authorization for an alien to be
lawfully employed, 8 U.S.C 1103(a), 1324a(h)(3), is
unrelated to state-law expenses for driver’s licenses
and social services. Indeed, respondents do not seriously contend that they have a stake in whether the
federal government accords others such treatment.
Respondents instead contend that different injuries
are within the “zone of interests.” But they do not
dispute that “the same interest must satisfy both”
Article III and the zone-of-interests test. 13A Charles
Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 3531.7, at 513 (3d ed. 2008). “[T]he plaintiff must
establish that the injury he complains of (his aggrievement, or the adverse effect upon him) falls
within the ‘zone of interests’ sought to be protected by
the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal
basis for his complaint.” Lujan v. National Wildlife
Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990).
B. Respondents’ assertion of these additional injuries also fails on its own terms Respondents contend
(Br. 37) that they fall within the zone of interests of
the INA as a whole because States bear indirect costs
associated with immigration. But this Court has refused “to accept th[at] level of generality in defining
the ‘relevant statute.’ ” Air Courier Conference of
Am. v. American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO,
498 U.S. 517, 529-530 (1991). And respondents fail to
identify a particular statutory provision under which
they are “aggrieved.” They have never asserted a
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claim under the few INA provisions that take account
of incidental financial impacts and allow States to seek
reimbursement. E.g., 8 U.S.C. 1231(i). Otherwise, the
INA does not “even hint[] at a concern about [the]
regional impact” of federal immigration policy. Federation for Am. Immigration Reform, Inc. v. Reno, 93
F.3d 897, 899, 901 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 521
U.S. 1119 (1997) (prospect that aliens may “diminish[]
employment opportunities” or “crowd[] public schools
and other government facilities and services” does not
fall within the INA’s zone of interests).
Nor does Section 1324a encompass a State interest
in guarding citizens against “labor-market distortion.”
Resps. Br. 37. That provision does not depart from
the background rule that States cannot sue the federal
government as parens patriae. See p. 8, supra.
Similarly, litigants do not gain an APA cause of action simply because they wish to comment on agency
rulemaking. That approach would deprive the zoneof-interests test “of virtually all meaning.” Air Courier Conference, 498 U.S. at 529-530. See U.S. Br. 35.
III. THE GUIDANCE INVOLVES MATTERS THAT ARE
COMMITTED TO AGENCY DISCRETION BY LAW

Respondents agree (Br. 38-39) that, under Heckler
v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), they cannot impair
“the Executive’s enforcement discretion,” and that the
Executive remains free “to issue ‘low-priority’ identification cards to aliens.” That perfectly describes
deferred action itself, and effectively abandons any
challenge to the Guidance to that extent.
Heckler does not address the consequences that
flow from non-enforcement discretion, such as the
possible receipt of Social Security benefits. But the
government is not relying (Br. 39-41) on Heckler to
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bar review of the Guidance on account of its consequences. The government is arguing that the consequences do not make the Guidance reviewable because
the Guidance does not change them—they flow from
preexisting statutes, regulations, and policies. Furthermore, the government’s preexisting policies regarding those consequences are themselves committed to agency discretion, not because of Heckler but
because the relevant “provisions furnish ‘no meaningful standard against which to judge the [Secretary’s]
exercise of discretion.’ ” U.S. Br. 36 (quoting Lincoln
v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191 (1993)).
IV. THE GUIDANCE IS LAWFUL

The Guidance is a lawful exercise of the Secretary’s
broad authority to “[e]stablish[] national immigration
enforcement policies and priorities,” 6 U.S.C. 202(5),
and perform such acts as “he deems necessary for
carrying out his authority” to “administ[er]” the INA,
8 U.S.C. 1103(a). These capacious grants of authority
reflect Congress’s judgment that the Executive has a
particular need for flexibility to balance pressing,
often conflicting, and rapidly evolving resource, foreign-relations, national-security, and humanitarian
imperatives in the immigration context. See Arizona
v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) (“A principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials”).
Respondents fail to come to terms with the nature
of the Secretary’s statutory authority or the history of
its exercise. Respondents acknowledge (Br. 38-39)
that the Secretary has unreviewable authority to notify each person covered by the Guidance that he or she
will receive a non-binding, temporary reprieve. But
respondents nonetheless assert that Congress has
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drawn the line at non-enforcement of removal, and has
denied the Secretary the authority to deal with the
real-world consequences of his choices. But since
1960, the Executive has established more than 20
policies for according deferred action (or similar
forms of discretion) to large groups of aliens living in
the United States, including the Family Fairness
policy that covered as many as 1.5 million people—and
all of those policies enabled aliens to work lawfully.
See U.S. Br. 48-57. Indeed, since 1981, regulations
have reflected the commonsense proposition that
aliens who may remain in this country, as a matter of
the Executive’s discretion, also should be able to lawfully make ends meet for themselves and their families. 8 C.F.R. 274a.12(c)(14). And Congress has repeatedly ratified the government’s position that deferral of enforcement and work authorization go hand
in hand. See U.S. Br. 50-57.
Respondents are fundamentally wrong to claim
that the Guidance confers on aliens whose presence
Congress has deemed unlawful the right to remain
lawfully in the United States. Aliens covered by the
Guidance, like all aliens afforded deferred action, are
violating the law by remaining in the United States,
are subject to removal proceedings at the government’s discretion, and gain no defense to removal.
See pp. 16-18, infra. Deferred action itself reflects
nothing more than a judgment that the aliens’ ongoing
presence will be tolerated for a period of time, based
on enforcement priorities and humanitarian concerns,
and work authorization enables them to support themselves while they remain. If Congress believes that
the Secretary’s authority should not be exercised in
this manner, Congress is free to enact legislation to
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channel or constrain that authority—as Congress has
occasionally done in the past with respect to some
other exercises of immigration discretion by the Executive. But Congress has not done so in any way that
is relevant here, and there is no basis in existing law
to deny the Secretary the authority to implement the
Guidance.
A. “Lawful Presence”

1. Respondents’ principal challenge to the Guidance proceeds from a mistaken premise. Respondents
insist (e.g., Br. 17) that the Guidance “declares” unlawful conduct to be lawful. But the Guidance does no
such thing. Respondents primarily rely on a single
sentence in the Guidance, which states that “[d]eferred action does not confer any form of legal status
in this country, much less citizenship; it simply means
that, for a specified period of time, an individual is
permitted to be lawfully present in the United States.”
Pet. App. 413a. That sentence is purely descriptive
and has no operative, legal effect. Ibid. Deleting it
would not change the Guidance at all.
2. “Lawful presence” in immigration law is fundamentally different from lawful status under the INA.
See U.S. Br. 38-39; Memorandum from Donald
Neufeld, Acting Assoc. Dir, Consolidation of Guidance Concerning Unlawful Presence for Purposes of
Sections 212(a)(9)(B)(i) and 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the
Act 9-11 (May 6, 2009) (Unlawful Presence Guidance).
Aliens with lawful status under the INA are here
lawfully; their presence therefore is not a basis for
removal. By contrast, mere “lawful presence” occurs
when the Executive “openly tolerate[s] an undocumented alien’s continued presence in the United
States for a fixed period (subject to revocation at the
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agency’s discretion),” notwithstanding that the alien
lacks lawful status and is present in violation of law.
J.A. 76; see U.S. Br. 38-39; Unlawful Presence Guidance 9-11. “Lawful presence” thus might be better
called “tolerated presence.” Even with deferred action and “lawful presence,” aliens lack lawful status,
are actually present in violation of law, are subject to
enforcement at the government’s discretion, and gain
no defense to removal. 8 U.S.C. 1229a; see 8 U.S.C.
1182(a)(6)(A)(i), 1227(a)(1)(B); see also Pet. App. 413a,
416a-417a; Unlawful Presence Guidance 42 (“does not
make the alien’s status lawful”). The Guidance changes none of that.
Moreover, there is no overarching and unified concept of “lawful presence” that triggers a “coherent,
aggregated package of ancillary ‘benefits.’ ” Anil
Kalhan, Deferred Action, Supervised Enforcement
Discretion, and the Rule of Law Basis for Executive
Action on Immigration, 63 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. Discourse 58, 66 (2015). Congress instead has used “lawful presence” in a technical sense in specific provisions
to allow the Secretary to decide which categories of
aliens should qualify for particular consequences.
Aliens who the Secretary determines are “lawfully
present” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1611(b)(2)
may receive Social Security benefits. But the regulatory definition of that term is relevant “[f]or the purposes of [those benefits] only,” 8 C.F.R. 1.3(a), and
does not “confer any immigration status or benefit
under the [INA],” 61 Fed. Reg. 47,040 (Sept. 6, 1996).
Similarly, the separate definition of “unlawfully present” for accruing time towards the inadmissibility
bars applies only “[f]or purposes of th[at] paragraph.”
8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii). Aliens thus can be “lawfully
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present” for one purpose but not the other. Aliens
with pending applications for temporary protected
status (TPS), for example, toll accrual of unlawful
presence but cannot receive Social Security benefits.
Unlawful Presence Guidance 7; see 8 C.F.R. 1.3(a).
Notably, Texas itself uses “lawfully present” in just
this way—to identify categories of aliens eligible for a
benefit (i.e., a driver’s license), including many who
lack lawful status. Verifying Lawful Presence 1-5. 2
B. Social Security And Tolling

1. The Guidance does not “flout[] Congress’s 1996
decision to eliminate most federal benefits for unlawfully present aliens.” Resps. Br. 47. DHS’s regulations respect that decision. Before 1996, aliens with
deferred action could receive most federal benefits
because they were “permanently residing in the
United States under color of law” (PRUCOL). E.g., 42
U.S.C. 1382c(a) (1988); 20 C.F.R. 416.1618(a) and
(b)(11) (1994). But courts interpreted PRUCOL expansively also to include aliens without deferred action, if the government merely did not contemplate
removing them. See Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556,
1575-1578 (2d Cir. 1985). In 1996, Congress prohibited aliens from receiving most federal benefits unless
they are “qualified.” 8 U.S.C. 1611(a). Aliens with
2

Respondents’ claim (Br. 11-12) that DAPA “triggers” access to
advance parole is incorrect. The Guidance does not establish any
advance parole policy or grant advance parole to anybody. The
Secretary “may” grant parole (and advance parole) to immigrants
without regard to deferred action or any “lawful presence.” 8
U.S.C. 1182(d)(5); 8 C.F.R. 212.5(f ). While DHS has been permissive in authorizing travel by DACA recipients via advance parole,
no such policy determination has been made with respect to
DAPA.

19
deferred action—including under the Guidance—are
not “qualified,” see 8 U.S.C. 1641(b), and thus can no
longer receive most federal benefits.
At the same time, however, Congress created an
express exception from that bar: Non-“qualified”
aliens may receive Title II Social Security benefits if
they are “lawfully present in the United States as
determined by the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C.
1611(b)(2). The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) immediately promulgated regulations specifically providing that aliens with deferred action are
“lawfully present” for this purpose—but that an alien
“may not be deemed to be lawfully present solely on
the basis of the [INS’s] decision not to, or failure to,”
pursue removal. 61 Fed. Reg. at 47,041. The INS
thus included deferred action, but made fewer aliens
eligible for Social Security and cut back on judicial
interpretations of PRUCOL.
The next year, Congress ratified the INS’s definition of “lawful presence” by amending Section 1611(b)
also to allow non-“qualified” aliens to receive Medicare and Railroad Retirement benefits with the same
proviso that they be “lawfully present in the United
States as determined by the Attorney General.” Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, Tit. V,
§ 5561, 111 Stat. 638. Congress thus added the same
language to the same subsection of the same statute to
“clarify that, despite general restrictions on Federal
benefits for ‘non-qualified’ aliens, certain benefits
* * * are to remain available to those who earned
them through work.” H.R. Rep. No. 78, 105th Cong.,
1st Sess. 94 (1997). That powerfully supports the
government’s interpretation.
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2. Respondents similarly argue (Br. 49-50) that deferred action cannot toll accrual of “unlawful presence” for purposes of the three- and ten-year bars in 8
U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B). Section 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii) provides that an alien is “deemed” to be “unlawfully present” when he is present “after the expiration of the
period of stay authorized by the [Secretary] or is
present * * * without being admitted or paroled.” 8
U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii). Respondents do not dispute
that deferred action is an authorized “period of stay.”
But noting that deferred action is not an “admi[ssion]
or parole[],” they contend (Br. 50) that “[t]he disjunctive second clause” forecloses DHS’s interpretation.
Respondents are incorrect. The first clause addresses how an alien’s presence should be “deemed”
after expiration of a period of stay, not during such a
period. DHS sensibly construes Section 1182(a)(9)(B)
as a whole not to deem an alien “unlawfully present”
during an authorized stay, regardless of whether he
was previously “admitted or paroled.” See Unlawful
Presence Guidance 22. Otherwise, “unlawful presence” would accrue when an alien’s presence is actually lawful. For example, asylum is a lawful status, but
it does not constitute an “admission” (or parole). In re
V- X-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 147, 150-152 (B.I.A. 2013). On
respondents’ view, aliens who entered without inspection then received asylum would still accrue “unlawful
presence”—notwithstanding that they actually have
lawful status. That would make little sense.
3. Even if DHS impermissibly interpreted “lawful
presence” in the Social Security or tolling provisions,
that would provide no basis for enjoining the Guidance. The Guidance does not change those interpretations. If respondents disagree with those determina-
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tions, they should petition for rulemaking—or at most
a court, in a case properly before it, could declare that
those interpretations are invalid. Indeed, the accrual
issue only matters for individuals who entered unlawfully (i.e., without being “admitted or paroled”) and
obtain deferred action before their 19th birthday—a
sliver of the population covered by the Guidance. And
the inadmissibility bar is only triggered if a person
“depart[s].” 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B); Unlawful Presence Guidance 16-17.
C. Work Authorization
1. The Secretary has discretion to authorize aliens to
work

Since 1981, federal regulations—adopted pursuant
to the Secretary’s broad authority under 8 U.S.C.
1103(a)—have provided that any alien with deferred
action may apply for work authorization based on
economic need. 8 C.F.R. 274a.12(c)(14). The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), 8
U.S.C. 1324a, subsequently reinforced that regulation,
providing that aliens may be authorized to work “by
th[e] [INA] or by the [Secretary].”
8 U.S.C.
1324a(h)(3) (emphasis added).
Respondents nonetheless argue (Br. 56) that IRCA
“repudiated” the Executive’s position that it may
authorize aliens to be employed. Specifically, they
posit (Br. 52-53 n.42) that “by the [Secretary]” refers
only to categories of aliens for whom the INA itself
directs that “the Executive either must or may separately grant work authorization.” But Congress would
not have attempted to repudiate the Attorney General’s settled position that he can authorize aliens to
work by enacting a law expressly providing that he
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can do just that. The INS long ago rejected respondents’ interpretation, concluding instead that IRCA
ratified the INS’s prior view. 52 Fed. Reg. 46,093
(Dec. 4, 1987). That longstanding interpretation warrants deference. U.S. Br. 54-55.
Respondents are equally wrong to argue (Br. 51
n.39) that DHS’s regulation specifically allowing aliens with deferred action to apply for work authorization is valid only for “the four categories of deferredaction recipients that Congress made eligible for work
authorization,” and that this argument is timely because it did not accrue until now. When that regulation was promulgated in 1981 and repromulgated
in 1987, deferred action was exclusively accorded
“without express statutory authorization.” Reno v.
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525
U.S. 471, 484 (1999) (AADC). The statutes mentioning
“deferred action” were enacted beginning in 2000.
See U.S. Br. 58-59. In respondents’ view, DHS’s regulation thus applied to a null set for nearly 20 years.
That cannot be correct.
2. The Secretary has discretion to authorize the aliens
covered by the Guidance to work

a. Since 1960, the government has established
more than 20 policies for exercising discretion via
deferred action or similar practices, for aliens in defined categories, and all of those policies enabled aliens to work lawfully. See U.S. Br. 48-57. Respondents contend (Br. 54-55) that Congress has systematically curtailed DHS’s authority by amending the parole and voluntary departure statutes and codifying
TPS. But none of those changes are relevant here.
First, none of the government’s examples involved
parole. They involved deferred action, deferred en-
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forced departure (DED), and extended voluntary
departure (EVD) for aliens who were already living
here. See U.S. Br. 48-50. Second, Congress established TPS to codify DHS’s discretionary practice of
providing safe haven on a nationality basis, instituting
a “more formal and orderly mechanism.” H.R. Rep.
No. 627, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1988); see Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT), Pub. L. No. 101-649, Tit.
III, § 302(a), 104 Stat. 5030 (8 U.S.C. 1254a). In codifying (not repudiating) that practice, Congress confirmed that the Secretary otherwise possessed the
requisite authority. And although Congress made
TPS the exclusive basis for providing nationalitybased safe harbor, 8 U.S.C. 1254a(g), Congress did not
restrict the Executive’s discretion to provide similar
relief for different or additional reasons. U.S. Br. 49
n.9; see President George H.W. Bush, Statement on
Signing the Immigration Act of 1990 (Nov. 29, 1990).
Third, there would have been no reason for Congress to amend the voluntary departure statute in
1996 to stop the Executive from using EVD. Resps.
Br. 54. By then, the Executive had already stopped.
Id. at 55. The Executive instead used DED and deferred action, which Congress did not curtail. 3
3

EVD is also different from “voluntary departure” under
8 U.S.C. 1254(e) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). That statute allowed
aliens “under deportation proceedings” to “depart voluntarily” “in
lieu of deportation.” Ibid. EVD was accorded without regard to
whether deportation proceedings were underway and enabled
aliens to remain without departing. E.g., J.A. 213-215. The INS’s
EVD regulations accordingly identified Section 1103(a) as the
authority. See 43 Fed. Reg. 29,258 (July 10, 1978); accord Hotel &
Rest. Emps. Union, Local 25 v. Smith, 846 F.2d 1499, 1510 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Mikva, J.); id. at 519 (Silberman, J.) (“extrastatutory”).
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b. Respondents contend (Br. 56-57) that IRCA’s
“one-time legalization program” does not imply power
“to create precisely the sort of magnet for unlawful
immigration that Congress sought to avoid.” But the
Guidance is not a legalization program. Unlike IRCA,
it does not confer lawful status; it provides only a nonbinding, temporary reprieve as a matter of discretion.
Nor is it a magnet: It reaches only aliens who have
already lived here since 2010, and frees up resources
for increased border enforcement. U.S. Br. 47.
Legislation and experience after IRCA further confirm that the Guidance is lawful. The INS established
the Family Fairness policy in 1987, then expanded it
in 1990 to target as many as 1.5 million people—
approximately 40% of the undocumented population—
for relief and work authorization. U.S. Br. 64. The
policy here is strikingly similar. Respondents note
(Br. 54 n.43) that only 47,000 obtained relief under
that policy—but Congress swiftly enacted a program
that granted lawful status to the same aliens and approved the policy’s ongoing operation in the interim.
IMMACT § 301(g), 104 Stat. 5030. Respondents contend (Br. 55) that Congress did not thereby “ratif[y] a
claimed Executive authority to grant broader relief
unilaterally.” But the Guidance is materially identical.
Under both policies, individuals are informed of a nonbinding and temporary reprieve, may apply for work
authorization, and in turn may participate in Title II
Social Security. See J.A. 213-215 (forbearance and
work authorization); see also 42 U.S.C. 405(c)(2)(B)
(1988); 20 C.F.R. 422.104(b) and (c) (1990) (Social
Security).
c. Respondents’ suggest (Br. 58) that the Secretary
can grant work authorization only to “small” deferred-
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action categories, contending that the INS “justified
its deferred-action regulation based on the miniscule
number of work authorizations it would allow.” That
is misleading, as the INS was not referring specifically to deferred action. When the INS recodified all of
its work-authorization regulations in 1987, it mentioned that “the total number of aliens authorized to
accept employment is quite small and the impact on
the labor market is minimal” to rebut an argument
that it was circumventing the INA’s labor-certification
provisions by not “keep[ing] statistical records of the
number of aliens permitted to work” under those
regulations. 52 Fed. Reg. at 46,092.
That statement should be read in context. Even at
the time, the INS clearly issued work authorization in
significant numbers to categories not expressly identified by the INA as work-eligible. In 1987, applicants
for adjustment of status or asylum obtained work
authorization solely by regulation.
8 C.F.R.
274a.12(c)(8) and (9) (1988). In 1986, 225,598 aliens
adjusted status and 81,017 applied for asylum. INS,
1986 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Tbls. 6, 20, at 14, 41 (1987).
In 1987, the INS announced a policy to accord EVD
and work authorization to between 150,000 and
200,000 Nicaraguans. J.A. 210. In 1990, the INS
expanded the Family Fairness policy to target a group
of as many as 1.5 million for EVD and work authorization. J.A. 65, 213-215. Congress responded by ratifying that policy—and amending Section 1324a without
constraining the Secretary’s discretion to authorize
work. U.S. Br. 57.
From 2008 through 2014, DHS issued or renewed
3.4 million work authorizations (averaging 485,000

26
annually) to aliens who had filed applications for adjustment of status, without specific statutory authorization for that category. See USCIS, I-765 Approvals, Denials, Pending by Class Preference and Reason for Filing (Feb. 6, 2015) (C9 category). 4 The
Secretary’s discretion to authorize work by aliens thus
is not limited to “small” absolute numbers.
d. Respondents seek (Br. 59) to explain away this
consistent historical practice on the theory that the
INS was simply creating “bridges from one legal
status to another.” But they cite no statutory provision making that a prerequisite to the exercise of
discretion or granting of work authorization. Many
uses of deferred action, EVD, and DED have been not
as “bridges,” but “for humanitarian reasons.” AADC,
525 U.S. at 484; U.S. Br. 5-7; J.A. 209-212. And all of
those uses enabled aliens to work lawfully.
In any event, DAPA itself is a “bridge” for parents
who, with or without deferred action, already have an
existing statutory path to lawful status through obtaining favored “immediate relative” visas. See U.S.
Br. 46. At that point, parents who overstayed after a
lawful entry may adjust to lawful permanent resident
status, without more. See 8 U.S.C. 1255(a) and (c)(2).
Those who entered unlawfully may be admitted as
lawful permanent residents after departing and remaining abroad (unless a waiver is available) ten
years. 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(i), (ii), and (v). Estimates are that “[n]early half ” of the unauthorized
population overstayed. Pew Hispanic Ctr., Modes of
4

Some Nicaraguan and Haitian applicants have specific statutory authorization for work. See Resps. Br. 8 & n.4. In 2013, only
200 people adjusted status under those provisions. DHS, 2013
Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Tbl. 6, at 18 (Aug. 2014).
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Entry for the Unauthorized Migrant Population 1
(May 22, 2006). These paths “take[] time,” and DAPA
provides “a mechanism for families to remain together, depending on their circumstances, for some or all
of the intervening period.” J.A. 93-94.
In short, the Guidance oversteps no limit—
justiciable or otherwise—on the Secretary’s authority
under the INA. The choice of which lowest-priority
aliens warrant deferred action is committed to his
discretion by law, as respondents concede. He similarly has the authority under Sections 1103(a) and
1324a(h)(3) to issue work authorization to every such
alien with economic need. 8 C.F.R. 274a.12(c)(14).
V. THE GUIDANCE IS EXEMPT FROM NOTICE-ANDCOMMENT REQUIREMENTS

The Guidance is a general statement of agency policy exempt from notice-and-comment requirements
because it “advise[s] the public prospectively of the
manner in which [DHS] proposes to exercise a discretionary power,” Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S.
281, 302 n.31 (1979) (quoting Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 30 n.3 (1947)), namely, to defer action. See
National Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243,
252 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Kavanaugh, J.). Respondents do
not dispute that the Guidance satisfies this Court’s
straightforward test. See U.S. Br. 65-68.
A. Respondents instead propose different tests.
They first argue (Br. 60-66) that the Guidance must go
through notice and comment because it supposedly
binds the discretion of individual DHS agents. But
that is backwards. “Indeed, a central purpose of general policy statements is to permit the agency head to
direct the implementation of agency policy by lower-
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level officials,” as they help ensure that individual
agents’ actions are not arbitrary or capricious. Admin. Law Scholars Amicus Br. 4; see id. at 8-17. Respondents’ test, by contrast, would “drive agency
policy-making out of public view,” and lead to less
oversight of agency action. Id. at 16.
In any event, DAPA does not “bind” DHS agents to
accord deferred action to anyone. DHS agents must
deny a deferred-action request—even when every
other criterion is satisfied—unless the alien “present[s] no other factors that, in the exercise of discretion, make[] the grant of deferred action inappropriate.” Pet. App. 417a; see id. at 419a (“[T]he ultimate
judgment” is “determined on a case-by-case basis.”).
Respondents view these express prerequisites to
deferred action as pretextual. But because DAPA can
be validly applied even under respondents’ test, and in
light of the strong presumption of official regularity, it
is improper to enjoin DAPA where it “has yet to be
implemented.” Id. at 131a (King, J., dissenting); see
id. at 234a-241a (Higginson, J., dissenting).
B. Respondents also argue (Br. 66-67) that notice
and comment is required because the Guidance has
consequences “affect[ing] individual rights.” Most
exercises of discretion not to enforce a law against
someone affect that person’s rights in some sense.
But that does not give a rule “the force and effect of
law”—i.e., create rights and obligations—which is
what characterizes a substantive rule requiring notice
and comment. Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 302 n.31;
see Admin. Law Scholars Amicus Br. 17-19. Indeed,
the APA expressly provides that a “statement of policy” may “affect[] a member of the public” and be “relied on, used, or cited as precedent by an agency
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against a party,” so long as it was made publicly available or there was actual notice, as occurred here.
5 U.S.C. 552(a)(2). Myriad policies similar to the
Guidance have been established without notice-andcomment procedures. See U.S. Br. 69-71. Respondents rely (Br. 61-62) on Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199
(1974), but the APA’s notice-and-comment provisions
“were not at issue in Ruiz.” Vigil, 508 U.S. at 199.
Rather, the Bureau of Indian Affairs had failed to
comply with its own, more rigorous notice requirement. Ibid.; see Ruiz, 415 U.S. at 233-234.
More fundamentally, any notice-and-comment requirements have already been satisfied for deferred
action’s consequences: Duly-promulgated regulations
provide that all aliens with deferred action may apply
for work authorization based on economic need and
receive Social Security benefits, if they have earned
them and are otherwise eligible. 8 C.F.R. 1.3(a)(4)(vi),
274a.12(c)(14). 5 Accordingly, unlike the agency action
in Ruiz, the Guidance does not establish eligibility
criteria for the applicability of those provisions:
Those criteria were already established via preexisting regulations adopted through notice-and-comment
rulemaking.
VI. THE TAKE CARE CLAUSE PROVIDES NO BASIS
FOR RELIEF

A. Respondents’ “Take Care” argument is meritless. They insist (Br. 71) that it “is distinct from
5

DHS’s interpretations of “lawful presence” for purposes of
tolling and Social Security are exempt from notice-and-comment
requirements as interpretative rules. See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A). The
Social Security rule also falls squarely within the “benefits” exception. 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(2).
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[their] statutory arguments,” but their arguments are
one and the same: They argue that the Guidance
“violates explicit as well as implicit congressional
objectives” (Br. 75); it is “[a] ‘complete abdication’ of
lawful-presence and work-authorization statutes”
(ibid.); and it “seeks to make unlawful presence lawful” (Br. 73). Either the Guidance is within the Secretary’s statutory authority or it is not.
Action by the Judiciary to enjoin the Executive on
the basis of the Take Care Clause would, however,
raise grave structural concerns about the relationship
between the two Branches. This Court has never
viewed the Clause as an appropriate subject for judicial intervention. Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 475, 499 (1867). Respondents downplay (Br. 7172) these concerns, arguing that their claim is directed at the Secretary, not the President himself. But
the Constitution assigns the responsibility to “take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” to the
President—not the courts. U.S. Const. Art. II, § 3,
Cl. 5. In Johnson, Mississippi challenged the execution of the Reconstruction Acts by the President and
a subordinate—and this Court dismissed the suit in its
entirety. See 71 U.S. at 497-498.
Respondents point (Br. 71-77) to Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), but the
government (unsuccessfully) invoked the Take Care
Clause in defense as an affirmative source of authority
for the President’s action. Id. at 587. Kendall v.
United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Peters) 524
(1838), is also inapposite. That case involved a “purely
ministerial” duty subject to “no discretion whatever.”
Id. at 613. The President did not assert power to
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dispense with that statute; “such power was disclaimed.” Ibid. So too here.
B. In all events, the Secretary is faithfully enforcing the immigration laws. U.S. Br. 43-47, 74-75. Respondents contend (Br. 74) that, if the government
prevails, future Presidents could abandon enforcement of “environmental laws, or the Voting Rights
Act,” or other laws. But those hypotheticals are far
removed. The Secretary is vigorously enforcing the
immigration laws, and the Guidance helps focus more
resources on Congress’s chosen priorities. Moreover,
the Executive has unusually broad discretion in immigration; few other areas involve status offenses where
the exercise of discretion unavoidably tolerates an
ongoing violation; none has such a well-established
tradition, ratified by Congress, of notifying large
groups of non-binding, temporary reprieves; and deferred action’s consequences flow from immigrationspecific laws.
In the end, the Secretary asserts only that he is
acting within the immigration laws. He is not attempting to declare lawful conduct that Congress has
made unlawful. And whether the Secretary has correctly interpreted the immigration laws presents a
straightforward statutory question, not cause for a
constitutional confrontation.
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* * * * *
For the foregoing reasons and those stated in our
opening brief, the judgment of the court of appeals
should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted.
DONALD B. VERRILLI, JR.
Solicitor General
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